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Abstract. We study the optimal demand allocation policies to induce high
service capacity and achieve minimum expected sojourn times in equilibrium
in a queueing system with multiple strategic servers. We propose the mixed
threshold allocation policy as an optimal state-dependent policy that induces
optimal service capacity from strategic servers. Compensation to the server
can be paid at customer allocation or upon job completion. Our study focuses
on the use of a multiple-server mixed threshold allocation policy to replicate
the demand of a given state-independent policy to achieve a symmetric equi-
librium with lower expected sojourn time. The results indicate that, under
both payment schemes, for any given multiple-server state-independent policy,
there exists a multiple-server threshold policy that produces identical demand
allocation and Nash equilibrium (if any). Moreover, the policy can be designed
to minimize the expected sojourn time at a symmetric equilibrium. Further-
more, under the payment-at-allocation scheme, our results, combining with
existing results on the optimality of the multiple-server linear allocation pol-
icy, show that the mixed threshold policy can achieve the maximum feasible
service capacity and thus the minimum feasible equilibrium expected sojourn
time. Hence, our results agree with previous two-server results and affirm
that a trade-off between incentives and efficiency need not exist in the case of
multiple servers.
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1. Introduction. The problem of finding the optimal control policy for a queueing
system has been widely studied in the literature, see for instance [5, 9, 10]. Recent
studies have focused on queueing systems with strategic servers [2, 7], particularly
on deriving an optimal policy to induce high service capacities in a competitive en-
vironment [1, 3, 6]. In these systems, the servers decide their own service capacities
and compete with each other for higher market share and profit. For example, this
can be used to model service systems composed of independently-operating service
providers, or supply chains with make-to-order suppliers who make their own op-
erating decisions. It is then of interest what kind of policy for customer allocation
and compensation can be used to induce high service capacities from the servers
with minimum cost.
With performance-based demand allocation, the buyer decides the amount of
demand to be allocated to a server based on the service capacities of all servers.
This has been identified as a plausible option among different means to motivate
faster service, as it requires little bargaining power of the buyer when compared with
other motivators, like imposing late fees or offering a higher price per job [1]. The
common-queue and separate-queue allocation studied in [6] are examples of such
demand allocation policies. In the former, a common queue is maintained for two
strategic servers and the demand allocated to a server is endogenously determined.
In the latter, separate queues are maintained for each server and the demand is
allocated to the two queues in proportions such that the expected waiting times in
the two queues are the same. Extension of these two policies to the case of multiple
servers have been studied in [3].
While both allocation policies discussed in [6] may be implemented without ob-
serving the servers’ capacities, demand allocation policies that explicitly account for
the servers’ chosen service capacities may give the buyer a greater power to control
servers’ incentives and could be designed to induce the maximum feasible service
capacity from servers. This has been shown in [1], where several state-dependent
and state-independent allocation policies are studied and compared. Under the
assumption that payment to the servers are made at customer allocation, it was
concluded that the optimal policies in the two classes, respectively the linear allo-
cation and the mixed threshold allocation, can induce the same maximum feasible
service capacity, and thus there are no trade-off between incentives and efficiency.
The optimal state-independent policy in [1] has been extended to the case of
multiple servers in [14], whereas the optimality argument of the two-server mixed
threshold policy is significantly more difficult to generalize to the case of multiple
servers and has not been considered in the literature.
The main aim of this paper is to generalize the mixed threshold policy proposed
by [1] to the multiple-server mixed threshold policy, and study to what extent
these policies can replicate the demand allocation of state-independent policies.
We address both cases of the payment-at-allocation and payment-upon-completion
scheme. Our result shows that, if we prohibit server overloading, then the multiple-
server mixed threshold policies can replicate the demand allocation of any policy.
Furthermore, under the payment-at-allocation scheme, the replication of the de-
mand allocation of a state-independent policy with server overloading is feasible if
we allow ourselves to include single-sourcing with some probability in the mixed
threshold policy. Assuming that all servers are identical, in the Nash equilibrium,
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the expected sojourn time with our mixed threshold policy is optimal with the equi-
librium service capacities. In other words, our results concur with the two-server
results of [1] and indicate that there is no trade-off between incentives and efficiency.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes related
literature. Section 3 introduces the multiple-server demand allocation problem and
review previous results obtained by [1] and [14]. In Section 4, we generalize the two-
server threshold policy to an n-server threshold policy and find the set of allocated
demand vectors that can be replicated using an n-server mixed threshold policy. In
Section 5, we summarize the result and give a discussion on further research issues.
2. Literature review. Game theoretic analysis of equilibrium service capacities
of two or more strategic servers has been considered in [2, 7]. Later studies focused
on choosing an optimal policy to induce high service capacities in a competitive en-
vironment [1, 3, 6]. In these systems, the servers decide their own service capacities
and compete with each other for market share and profit. Game theory [11] is used
to model the interactions between strategic servers so as to find out the equilibrium
service capacities and profits.
In [6], the common-queue and separate-queue allocation were compared with two
strategic servers in a principal-agent framework (see [8]) to minimize cost needed
to maintain expected sojourn time at or below a required level. The equilibrium
service capacities chosen by the servers were found and compared. It was shown
that the separate-queue allocation may give lower costs than the common-queue
allocation, suggesting that there is a trade-off between efficiency and incentives.
Extension of these two policies and the corresponding comparison to the case of
multiple servers have been done in [3].
The study in [1] considered various demand allocation policies that explicitly
account for the servers’ chosen service capacities. The principal-agent problem
studied is based on a two-server Markovian queueing system, where the buyer would
like to induce a high service capacity from strategic servers through a performance-
based allocation of demand and a compensation proportional to allocated demand.
Two classes of allocation policies, namely state-independent allocation policies and
state-dependent allocation policies are studied and compared. The model under
each allocation policy is considered as a multiple-player strategic game and the
Nash equilibrium, if any, is identified. Assuming payment to servers is made at
customer allocation, they show that the linear allocation policy is an optimal state-
independent policy and induces the maximum feasible service capacity from servers.
They further argue that by randomizing between two-server threshold allocation
policies, one could achieve an allocation identical to the linear allocation policy.
Thus an optimal state-dependent policy that induces the maximum feasible service
capacity can be obtained. However, we remark that in cases where the capacity of
the primary server is lower than its allocated demand, the mixed threshold policy
under the payment-at-allocation scheme implies that we allocate customers only to
the primary server, which makes the system unstable even when the total service
capacity is greater than the total demand rate, and at the same time we would be
paying the server for more customers than it can actually serve. Similar optimality
results have not been obtained in their study for the case where servers are paid
upon job completion.
The optimality of the multiple-server linear allocation policy, again under the
payment-at-allocation scheme, has been proved in [14]. However, the optimality
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argument of the two-server mixed threshold policy, as proposed by [1], has not been
considered in the case of multiple servers and the extension is much more mathe-
matically complicated. The main difficulty lies in the complexity of the queueing
system under an n-server threshold policy. With non-strategic servers, there have
been studies on the optimality of threshold-type policies for heterogeneous server
systems [10, 13]. However, the steady-state probabilities of the system cannot be
obtained explicitly, and it is not straightforward to see how the demand alloca-
tion changes with the thresholds. Therefore, given a fixed state-independent policy,
showing the existence of a mixed threshold policy that gives the same identical
allocation is much more difficult in the case of multiple servers as the allocation
vector (with respect to each chosen service capacity vector) is of higher dimension
than in the two-server case. The study in this paper focuses on showing the set of
allocation vectors that can be achieved by mixed threshold policies and establishing
a similar result of optimality of the mixed threshold policies in the multiple-server
case.
3. The multiple-server demand allocation problem. We consider a queueing
system with n identical strategic servers. Customers arrive to the system according
to a Poisson process with rate λ. Each server chooses its own service capacity
µi and incurs a cost at the rate of c(µi), where c(0) = 0 and c(.) is assumed to
be strictly increasing and convex, i.e. c′(.) > 0 and c′′(.) ≥ 0. The time that
Server i serves a customer is, independent of all other service times, exponentially
distributed with mean rate µi. The buyer pays each server an amount of R for each
customer it completes serving. The aim of the buyer is to select a demand allocation
policy, through which the customers are assigned to the servers, that minimizes the
expected sojourn time for a customer in the equilibrium. We assume
c
(
λ
n
)
<
λR
n
,
which is the necessary condition for the expected waiting times to be finite in an
equilibrium where the n servers split the demand equally. Moreover, as a benchmark
for comparison, we define the maximum feasible service capacity as µ¯ where c(µ¯) =
λR/n. In other words, the maximum feasible service capacity is the service capacity
at which, when chosen by all servers, each server receives equal share of the demand
and earns zero profit.
We consider two different payment schemes here. The first one is the payment-
at-allocation scheme, where a server is paid when the customer is allocated to the
server. The second one is the payment-upon-completion scheme, where a server is
paid for a customer when it completes the service for the customer. When the
service capacity of a server exceeds or equals its allocated demand rate, the two
payment schemes essentially pay the same amount to the servers in the long run.
However, if the service capacity µi of a server i is lower than its allocated demand
rate λi, i.e. µi < λi, the payment-at-allocation scheme will be paying the server at
R times its allocated demand rate, i.e. Rλi, while the payment-upon-completion
scheme will be paying the server at R times its service rate, i.e. Rµi, which is lower
than in the former case. It should be noted that, under the payment-at-completion
scheme, since a server i is paid at most at the rate of Rµi even if λi > µi, we can
only consider allocation policies with λi ≤ µi, i.e. we never need to overload a
server, as overloading the server does not pay more to the server and thus do not
help to give higher incentives to the server.
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3.1. State-independent and state-dependent allocation policies. As pro-
posed in [1], demand allocation policies can be divided into two classes, namely
the state-independent and state-dependent allocation policies. The class of state-
independent policies is characterized by the fact that under such policies, customer
allocation is only based on the service capacities of the servers, but not the states
of the servers (i.e., whether a server is busy or idle). Consequently, there is no
difference between allocating a customer to a server immediately upon its arrival
or not. We then assume that a First-In-First-Out (FIFO) queue is maintained
for each server, and customers are immediately allocated to the queue of a server
upon arrival. We further assume that the arrival of customers to each of these
servers follows a Poisson process with rate λi. This assumption holds, for instance,
when we allocate each customer to Server i with probability λi/λ. Examples of
state-independent policies with multiple servers are the separate-queue allocation
[3, 6], the linear allocation and the proportional allocation [1, 14]. In particular,
[14] proved that the n-server linear allocation policy is optimal under the payment-
at-allocation scheme. The other class of allocation policies, the state-dependent
policies, are policies that allow customer allocation to depend on the state of the
servers. Consequently, a customer may not be allocated to a server immediately
upon arrival. The most common example is the common-queue allocation policy
[3, 6], but here we will focus on a multiple-server generalization of the two-server
mixed threshold policy discussed in [1].
3.2. State-independent policies: A review of the multiple-server linear
allocation policy. Under the payment-at-allocation scheme, the two-server linear
allocation policy proposed by [1] has been shown to be an optimal state-independent
policy when appropriate parameters are chosen. Under the same payment scheme,
the multiple-server linear allocation policy and its optimality have been studied by
[14]. Under the n-server linear allocation policy, the allocation to Server i is given
by
λi(µ) =

θµ
ρ
i −
1
nˆ
(
θ
∑nˆ
j=1 µ
ρ
j − λ
)
i ≤ nˆ.
0 i > nˆ,
where the servers’ capacities are sorted in a decreasing order, θ > 0, 0 < ρ ≤ 1 and
nˆ ≤ n is the largest integer such that λnˆ ≥ 0 and µnˆ > 0.
It should be noted that under this n-server linear allocation, the demand allocated
to Server i can be greater than the service capacity chosen by Server i, i.e., λi(µ) >
µi for some capacity vector µ. In other words, with the policy under the payment-
at-allocation scheme, there are cases where a server is paid for more customers than
it can actually serve, but such cases do not occur in the Nash equilibrium of the
game.
Under the payment-at-allocation assumption (i.e. servers are paid for the job
at allocation), [14] modelled the decision of the servers’ capacities as an n-player
strategic game and proved the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium in
which the service capacity equals to the maximum feasible service capacity when
the appropriate values of θ and ρ are chosen. Specifically, when the cost function
c(.) is strictly convex, [14] proved that a unique equilibrium exists with
θ =
nc′(µ¯)
R(n− 1)
and ρ = 1
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when R > r1 = b. In the equilibrium µi = µ¯ for all i and the expected service times
are finite. For the case where the cost function c(.) is linear, i.e., c(µi) = bµi (b > 0),
[14] proved that a unique equilibrium exists with
θ =
n
n− 1
(
2bµ¯1/2
R
)
and ρ =
1
2
when R > r1 = c(λ/n)/(λ/n). In the equilibrium µi = µ¯ for all i and the expected
service times are finite. We remark that similar results have not been obtained
under the payment-upon-completion scheme.
3.3. The state-dependent policies: A review of the two-server mixed
threshold allocation policy. Although the multiple-server linear allocation pol-
icy has been proved to induce the maximum feasible capacity from the servers, we
are interested in investigating whether the same equilibrium service capacity can be
induced by a state-dependent allocation policy. The main reason is that linear al-
location, being a state-independent policy, does not allow for demand pooling, and
so it is possible for a customer to be waiting for a busy server while another server
is idle, even when the idle server could provide a lower expected sojourn time for
the customers. A state-dependent allocation policy that induces the same level of
service capacity could possibly give a lower expected sojourn time of the customers
in the equilibrium when compared to the linear allocation policy. For the case of
two servers, Cachon and Zhang ([1]) have shown that a mixed threshold allocation
policy achieves this goal.
The two-server threshold allocation has first been studied as a control policy
with non-strategic servers in the literature. In particular, it has been proved in [9]
that the buyer’s optimal allocation with two heterogeneous non-strategic servers
is of threshold type. Under a two-server threshold allocation, a single queue is
maintained for the two servers, but a job may not be allocated immediately to
a server upon arrival, even if the server is idle. Job allocation is based on the
designation of the primary (and secondary) server and a threshold parameter m.
When a job arrives, it is allocated to the primary server if it is idle or has fewer than
m jobs in queue and allocated to the secondary server only if it is idle, the primary
server is busy, and has m jobs in queue. The advantage of a threshold allocation
over a common-queue allocation is that, in some cases an idle server may be so
slow that waiting for the another busy but faster server may yield a lower expected
sojourn time. A numerical method for evaluating the system’s performance under
threshold allocation has been studied in [12]. It can be seen that, when different
values ofm are chosen, the demand allocated to the servers would be different. This
allows us to parametrize the policy to create the appropriate level of competition
that induces the desired service capacity in the equilibrium.
In Cachon and Zhang’s study [1] of the two-server allocation problem with strate-
gic servers, they proposed randomizing between threshold policies with different pa-
rameters to replicate the demand allocation of the linear allocation policy, so that
the maximum feasible service capacity can be attained in the Nash equilibrium.
Specifically, they argued that the buyer can allocate any portion of the buyer’s
demand to the primary server by varying which server is designated the primary
server and randomizing between different threshold values m. They supported their
claim by the fact that the primary server’s allocated demand increases with m and
when m is infinity, the primary server earns the buyer’s entire demand.
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The above argument is valid with many choices of service capacities, particularly
when the service capacities are close enough to the equilibrium ones, which assures
the existence of the desired Nash equilibrium. However, when the primary server’s
service capacity µ1 is less than the total demand λ, with any finite values of m, the
secondary server is allocated at least λ − µ1 of demand. The limit of the primary
server’s demand, as m goes to infinity, is µ1. The only way to allocate more than
µ1 of the demand to the primary server is not to use the secondary server at all,
i.e. setting m =∞ and making λ1 = λ, and to pay for the customers to the server
at allocation instead of service completion. However, this will cause the system to
be unstable, even in cases where µ1 + µ2 > λ, and is therefore undesirable.
If we prohibit server overloading (either by only allocating λi ≤ µi to Server i
or by not allowing the buyer to pay at customer allocation), then some allocated
demand vectors cannot be replicated by a two-server mixed threshold policy. It is
then important to know which allocated demand vectors can be replicated. We will
extend the two-server mixed threshold allocation policies to the case of n servers
and address the issue in the following sections.
4. Multiple-server threshold policies. In this section, we will generalize the
two-server threshold policy to an n-server threshold policy. We will assume that
the buyer pays the server for a customer when the service is completed.
4.1. The n-server policy. With n servers, where n ≥ 2, it is natural to extend the
two-server case by assigning the servers as the 1st, 2nd, . . . , nth servers and specifying
n − 1 threshold parameters. Similar control policies for non-strategic servers have
been studied in [10]. In some of these studies the threshold parameters may depend
on the state of the other servers. (More precisely, the threshold for the ith server
can depending on the state of the (i+1)th, . . . , nth servers). However, for simplicity
and because randomization gives enough flexibility for parameterizing the policy,
we shall assume that mi is a constant in each policy in our study.
An n-server (pure) threshold allocation policy T is specified by an assignment of
the Servers 1, 2, . . . , n as the 1st, 2nd, . . . , nth servers and the thresholds m2, . . . ,mn
where each mi is a nonnegative integer. We define m1 = 0. A single queue is
maintained in the system. When a customer arrives, it is assigned to Server 1 if it
is idle. If Servers 1, 2, . . . , i − 1 are all busy and the number of waiting customers
(including the new arrival) is more than m1 + . . . +mi, the customer is assigned
to Server i. (Alternatively, we can also assign the first customer in the queue for
Server i and let the new arrival wait in the queue.) Otherwise, it waits in the queue.
When Server i completes service of a customer, if the number of waiting customers
is more than m1+ . . .+mi, then the first customer in the queue is assigned to Server
i. If mi =∞ for some i, then no customer is allocated to Servers i, i+ 1, . . . , n.
Given any service capacity vector
µ = (µ1, µ2, . . . , µn)
the demand allocated to the servers via the threshold policy T is
λ(T ) = (λ
(T )
1 , λ
(T )
2 , . . . , λ
(T )
n )
where λ
(T )
i is defined to be Server i’s expected rate of receiving customers. In each
state, if Server i is idle, its rate of receiving customers is the arrival rate of customers
multiplied by the probability that an arriving customer is allocated to Server i. On
the other hand, when Server i is busy, its rate of receiving customers is µi if there
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are waiting customers that can be assigned to Server i upon service completion of
the current customer, and is zero otherwise. Because the n-server policy is much
more complicated, it is not straightforward to see what demand allocation can be
achieved by the pure policy and by randomizing between some n-server threshold
policies. In the following, we give some properties of an n-server pure threshold
allocation policy and its allocated demand λ.
Lemma 4.1. Given n servers with service capacity vector µ = (µ1, . . . , µn) where∑n
i=1 µi > λ. Suppose Server i is designated as the i
th server. Let λ = (λ1, . . . , λn)
be the allocated demand of an n-server pure threshold policy with the thresholds
m2, . . . ,mn. We have the following results:
(i) Let k = max{i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, mj < ∞ ∀j = 1, 2, . . . , i}. Then the system
is stable if and only if
∑k
i=1 µi > λ. When the system is stable, we have
λ =
∑n
i=1 λi.
(ii) If mi =∞ for some i, then λj = 0 for all j = i, i+ 1, . . . , n.
(iii) Suppose we fix i = 2, . . . , n and finite values of mj for j = 1, . . . , i − 1. Then
for any  > 0, there exists m∗i such that for any mi+1, . . . ,mn and mi > m
∗
i
we have
min

i−1∑
j=1
µj , λ

 ≥ i−1∑
j=1
λj > min

i−1∑
j=1
µj , λ

 − .
We have seen that the demand allocation to the servers can be varied by adjusting
the thresholds of a policy. However, because the thresholds only take integral values,
the demand allocation is limited to a countable set of points. To enable us to select
from a wider range of demand allocation, we introduce the n-server mixed threshold
policy, which randomizes between a number of pure threshold policies.
Definition 4.2. An n-server mixed threshold allocation policy τ is specified by
an integer k ≥ 1, real numbers α1, . . . , αk such that
∑k
i=1 αi = 1 and k n-server
threshold policies T1, . . . , Tk. When the mixed threshold allocation policy is used,
each of the threshold policy Ti is used with probability αi. The demand allocated
via the mixed threshold policy τ is then denoted by λ(τ) = (λ
(τ)
1 , λ
(τ)
2 , . . . , λ
(τ)
n ) and
given by
λ
(τ)
j =
k∑
i=1
αiλ
(Ti)
j
for any server j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
It is clear that the set of demand vectors that can be allocated by a pure threshold
policy when
∑n
i=1 µi > λ is contained in the set
Sµ =
{
λt : 0 ≤ λti ≤ min(µi, λ) and
n∑
i=1
λti = λ
}
.
Since Sµ is a convex set, it follows immediately that the set of demand vectors
that can be allocated by a mixed threshold policy is also contained in Sµ. In the
following, we explore which allocation vectors in Sµ can be achieved by some mixed
threshold policy given a fixed service capacity vector µ such that
∑n
i=1 µi > λ.
Unless otherwise specified, in the following we shall assume such a fixed service
capacity vector.
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Suppose we have a target demand allocation vector λt such that
∑n
i=1 λ
t
i = λ.
We say that an allocation policy τ with demand allocation λ(τ) is λt-dominated in
the order (i1, i2, . . . , in) if
n∑
j=l
λ
(τ)
ij
≤
n∑
j=l
λtij for all l = 2, . . . , n,
where i1, i2, . . . , in ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and are distinct.
Also note that the above condition implies that λ
(τ)
i1
≥ λti1 since
n∑
j=1
λ
(τ)
ij
=
n∑
j=1
λtij = λ.
Lemma 4.3. Suppose we have n servers with service capacity vector µ = (µ1, . . . , µn)
such that
n∑
i=1
µi > λ,
and an allocation vector
λt = (λt1, λ
t
2, . . . , λ
t
n)
such that
n∑
i=1
λti = λ.
If λtj < min(µj , λ) for all j = 1, 2, . . . , n, then there exists an n-server (pure)
threshold policy that is λt-dominated in the order (1, 2, . . . , n).
The pure threshold policies in Lemma 4.3 will be used in the following to compose
a mixed threshold policy that gives the our target demand allocation. To illustrate
the idea of we have obtained in the lemma, note that we can represent an allocated
demand in a diagram as in Figure 1 by showing each
∑n
j=k λij for k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Then a λt-dominated policy in the order (i1, i2, . . . , in), with demand allocation
λ(τ) have each of these quantities less than or equal to that of λt, as shown in
Figure 2.
λi1 + λi2 + . . .+ λin
λi2 + . . .+ λin
...
λin−1 + λin
λin
Figure 1. Expressing an allocation vector λ as a diagram of the∑n
j=k λij given (i1, i2, . . . , in), with k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
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λi1 + λi2 + . . .+ λin
...
λi2 + . . .+ λin
λin−1 + λin
λin
Figure 2. Illustrating the idea of an allocation policy τ that is
λt-dominated in the order (i1, i2, . . . , in). The gray bars represent
the target allocation λt and the white bars represent the demand
allocation λ(τ).
The following two lemmas are used to show that we can construct mixed threshold
policies with some nice properties for the construction of the one giving the target
demand allocation.
To facilitate our discussion, we say that an allocation policy τ with demand
allocation λ(τ) is λt-dominated and m-smaller in the order (i1, i2, . . . , in) if the
policy is λt-dominated in the order (i1, i2, . . . , in) and
λ
(τ)
ij
≤ λtij
for all j = m,m + 1, . . . , n, where m is an integer such that 2 ≤ m ≤ n and
i1, i2, . . . , in ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} are distinct.
Note that in the above definition, the property is equivalent up to any permu-
tation of im, im+1, . . . , in. We also note that any policy λ
t-dominated in the order
(i1, i2, . . . , in) is λ
t-dominated and n-smaller in the order (i1, i2, . . . , in). Therefore,
from Lemma 4.3 we have obtained a set of λt and n-smaller policies in different
orders (i1, i2, . . . , in). The idea of an λ
t-dominated and m-smaller policy in the
order (i1, i2, . . . , in) is illustrated in Figure 3.
In the following lemma, we show that, given policies that are λt-dominated and
m-smaller in all possible orders (j1, j2, . . . , jn), we can obtain λ
t-dominated and
(m− 1)-smaller policies in any order (i1, i2, . . . , in).
Lemma 4.4. For fixed µ and m ∈ {3, . . . , n}, suppose for each k = m−1,m, . . . , n,
we have a mixed threshold policy τm,k that is λ
t-dominated and m-smaller in the
order (1, 2, . . . ,m − 2, k,m − 1,m, . . . , k − 1, k + 1, . . . , n). Then there exists a
mixed threshold policy τm−1 that is λ
t-dominated and (m− 1)-smaller in the order
(1, 2, . . . , n).
Considering different orders of (i1, i2, . . . , in) and using Lemma 4.4 for induction
from m = n down to m = 2, we can obtain λt-dominated and 2-smaller policies
in any order (i1, i2, . . . , in). It can be seen easily that for such a policy, we have
λ
(τ)
i1
≥ λti1 , as illustrated in Figures 4 and 5. Such a policy can be restated in a
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λi1 + λi2 + . . .+ λin
λi2 + . . .+ λin
...
λim−1 + . . .+ λin
λim + . . .+ λin
. . .
...
λin−1 + λin
λin
Figure 3. The gray bars represent the target allocation λt and
the white bars represent the demand allocation λ(τ). In additional
to the requirement of a λt-dominated policy, this policy needs to
satisfy λij ≤ λ
t
ij for j = m,m + 1, . . . , n, as illustrated in the
diagram by breaking up the sum λim +λim+1 + . . .+λin into small
blocks of λim , λim+1 , . . . , λin and having each of the small blocks
corresponding to λ(τ) smaller than or equal to those corresponding
to λt.
simpler way as requiring {
λk ≥ λ
t
k
λj ≤ λ
t
j ∀j 6= k.
The following lemma states the existence of such a policy.
λi1 + λi2 + . . .+ λin
λi2 + . . .+ λin
. . .
...
λin−1 + λin
λin
Figure 4. A λt-dominated 2-smaller allocation policy in the order
(i1, i2, . . . , in). It then follows immediately that λi1 ≥ λ
t
i1 .
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λi1
λi2
...
λin−1
λin
Figure 5. A λt-dominated 2-smaller allocation policy in the order
(i1, i2, . . . , in) is equivalent to a policy that we are interested in in
Lemma 4.5 with k = i1.
Lemma 4.5. Suppose we have n servers with service capacity vector µ = (µ1, . . . ,
µn) such that
n∑
i=1
µi > λ,
and an allocation vector
λ
t = (λt1, λ
t
2, . . . , λ
t
n)
such that
n∑
i=1
λti = λ.
If λti < min(µi, λ) for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n, then for any fixed k, there exists an n-server
mixed threshold policy with allocated demand λ such that{
λk ≥ λ
t
k
λj ≤ λ
t
j ∀j 6= k.
(1)
Lemma 4.5 provides us with a set of policies that are close enough to the target
demand allocation in the sense that only one of the servers could possibly receive
more demand than the targeted one, with the other servers all receiving an equal or
less amount of demand compared to the targeted demand allocation. Using these
policies, we can find a mixed threshold policy that gives exactly our target demand
allocation. This is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose we have some fixed service capacity vector
µ = (µ1, . . . , µn) with
n∑
i=1
µi > λ
and target allocation vector
λt = (λt1, . . . , λ
t
n) with
n∑
i=1
λti = λ
and
0 < λti < min(µi, λ) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
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Then there exists a mixed threshold allocation policy with allocated demand λ such
that λi = λ
t
i for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
We have shown that for any µ with
∑n
i=1 µi > λ, any demand allocation vector
set in the interior of the set Sµ is the allocated demand of some mixed threshold
policy. Moreover, if λti = 0 for some i, the demand allocation can be achieved by
removing all servers i with λti = 0 and considering a mixed threshold policy for the
reduced number of servers. On the other hand, if λti = λ ≤ µi for some i, then it
can be achieved by assigning all customers to Server i. Therefore, the set
S′µ =
{
λt : 0 ≤ λti < µi, λ
t
i ≤ λ and
n∑
i=1
λti = λ
}
is achievable. It remains to investigate whether we could find a mixed threshold
policy that achieves λt where
∑n
i=1 λ
t
i = λ and λ
t
i = µi < λ for some i. However,
this is impossible, because whenever the system is stable (i.e. when the sum of
service capacities of all servers with finite thresholds is greater than the total demand
rate), the demand allocated to Server i, λi, must be strictly less than µi (as the
proportion of time of the system having no customers is positive). Therefore, in
order to have λi equal µi, the system must be unstable. This implies that
∑n
i=1 λi ≤∑n
i=1 µi < λ. The remaining demand λ−
∑n
i=1 µi then cannot be allocated. Thus it
is impossible to allocate to Server i exactly a demand of µi using a mixed threshold
allocation if all demand has to be allocated.
Nevertheless, the problem can be solved in two ways. First, note that λi ap-
proaches µi in the limit as the threshold mi+1 goes to infinity if
∑i
j=1 µj < λ. For
any  > 0, we can find a value of the threshold such that |µi−λi| < . Alternatively,
we can use a state-independent allocation and assign a proportion of µi/λ of the
arrivals to Server i for such cases.
4.2. Analysis on unstable queueing system. In the above sections, we have
mainly focused on the case where the total service capacities exceed the total de-
mand rate and so all demand are allocated, i.e.
∑n
i=1 λi = λ. If the sum of the
chosen service capacities are less than the total demand rate, µ1+ . . .+µn ≤ λ, the
queueing system is not stable regardless of the values of m2, . . . ,mn. Although it
is natural to utilize the servers as much as possible when the system is not stable,
the alternative of allocating strictly less than the service capacity of a server to it
may be useful with strategic servers to induce the servers to switch to higher ser-
vice capacities in the long run, since we are mainly concerned with the equilibrium
service capacities. Technically, designing an allocation policy that assigns λi < µi
to Server i in these cases may help to avoid the existence of an undesirable Nash
equilibrium where the queueing system is unstable.
In [1], under the state-independent linear allocation, a server may be given an
allocated demand more than, equal to or less than its service capacity when the
queueing system is not stable. We remark that with threshold allocation, when the
system is unstable, it remains impossible to allocate to a server a demand level that
is higher than its capacity, because a customer is only assigned to the server when
it is idle. Thus any demand allocation where λi > µi is not possible. As a pure
strategy, the buyer can choose to allocate a demand of zero or µi to Server i by
setting mi to be infinite or finite, respectively. Under the condition that
µ1 + µ2 + . . .+ µn ≤ λ
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the threshold mi does not affect the allocated demand of other servers. Conse-
quently, we can randomize between the values of mi and obtain any allocated de-
mand λi such that 0 ≤ λi ≤ µi. Therefore we conclude that the set of feasible
allocation when
µ1 + µ2 + . . .+ µn < λ
is the set of allocation vectors satisfying 0 ≤ λi ≤ µi.
4.3. Efficient mixed threshold policies. We have shown that the set of demand
allocation vectors
Sµ =
{
{λt : 0 ≤ λti ≤ min(µi, λ) and
∑n
i=1 λ
t
i = λ} if
∑n
i=1 µi > λ
{λt : 0 ≤ λti ≤ min(µi, λ)} if
∑n
i=1 µi ≤ λ
can be replicated by mixed threshold policies. However, it is not yet certain whether
such policies perform better than state-independent policies. It has been shown that
for servers with different service capacities, the optimal policy that gives the lowest
expected sojourn time is of threshold type [10], but some thresholds may depend
on the states of the other servers, and the mixed threshold policy we have may not
give the lowest expected sojourn time with respect to the chosen service capacities.
Indeed, in order to design an allocation policy that induces the server to choose
the maximum feasible capacity and thus minimizes equilibrium expected sojourn
times, efficiency must be given up with some out-of-equilibrium choices of service
capacities. Hence, our aim in this section is to find out whether the mixed threshold
policy can give a lower expected sojourn time in equilibrium when compared to the
state-independent policies.
As we deal with identical servers, we expect a symmetric equilibrium, where all
servers choose the same service capacity and receive equal share of the demand.
It is desirable that our mixed threshold policy gives the minimal expected sojourn
time in this case, which will be shown in the following two propositions.
Proposition 2. When µ1 = µ2 = . . . = µn = µc > λ/n one can randomize
among some threshold allocation policies with zero thresholds to obtain the demand
allocation λ1 = λ2 = . . . = λn = λ/n.
Proposition 3. In an n-server queueing system, given that µ1 = µ2 = . . . = µn =
µc, any n-server threshold allocation with all thresholds being zero gives the same
expected sojourn time as an n-server common-queue system where each server has
service capacity µc.
Finally, note that because any pure threshold policy with all threshold being
zeros has an expected sojourn time identical to that of the n-server common queue,
any mixed policy that is composed of such pure threshold policies would have the
same expected sojourn time too. Combining with Proposition 2, we have shown
that the mixed threshold policy used to replicate a state-independent policy could
be designed to have minimal sojourn times in a symmetric equilibrium, which is
better than the state-independent policy. Thus the use of a mixed threshold policy
could indeed help to improve efficiency and lower the expected sojourn time in the
equilibrium.
4.4. Interpretations and discussions. We have shown that for any fixed service
capacity vector µ and any target demand allocation vector λ such that 0 ≤ λi ≤ λ,
λi < µi and
∑n
i=1 λi = λ (if
∑n
i=1 µi > λ) it is possible to choose a mixed threshold
policy that gives the demand allocation λ. For the case where λi = µi, it can
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be catered for by using a state-independent allocation for that case. Applying
the respective policy for each service capacity vector µ when it is observed, we
have a state-dependent policy that gives the demand allocation λ(µ). In other
words, for any state-independent policy P1 with demand allocation λ such that 0 ≤
λi ≤ min(µi, λ), there exists a state-dependent policy that replicates the demand
allocation of the policy P1. Moreover, from the discussion in Section 3.3, we see
that the expected sojourn time under the state-dependent policy is lower than that
under policy P1. We conclude that for any state-independent policy that does
not overload the servers, i.e., λi ≤ µi, there exists a state-dependent policy that
replicates the same demand allocation, thus giving the same Nash equilibrium but
a lower expected sojourn time in the equilibrium.
The arguments above apply to both the payment-at-allocation and payment-
upon-completion cases. We note that server overloading under the payment-upon-
completion scheme is not meaningful as the server only receives payment for the cus-
tomers that it finishes serving, the same is not true under the payment-at-allocation
scheme. In this case, server overloading needs to be considered as that would re-
sult in a higher compensation rate to the server. In the following, we assume the
payment-at-allocation scheme and discuss the case where server overloading is per-
mitted. If we relax the conditions λi ≤ µi for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and use the payment-
at-allocation scheme, as we have seen in [14], there could be a state-independent
allocation that gives an equilibrium with the maximum feasible service capacity
with λi > µi in some cases. To replicate the allocation of such policies, we must
allow servers to be overloaded and use the payment-at-allocation scheme.
If we assign all the demand to one server, say Server i, and pay the server at
customer allocation, then the demand allocated to Server i and its rate of revenue,
would be λ and λR respectively. Randomizing this allocation with other mixed
threshold policies, it is possible to achieve any target demand allocation λ such
that 0 ≤ λi ≤ λ and
∑n
i=1 λi = λ. This can be easily proved by noting that
allocating all demand to Server i gives the demand allocation
λ = λei = (0, . . . , 0, λ︸︷︷︸
ithentry
, 0, . . . , 0),
for i = 1, . . . , n, and any target demand allocation can be expressed as a convex
combinations of these vectors. However, such an allocation results in infinite waiting
times and should be avoided as far as possible. Thus, for demand vectors such that
0 ≤ λi ≤ min(µi, λ), we can apply the results in previous subsections and use a
mixed threshold policy that comprises of only threshold policies with finite waiting
times to replicate the demand allocation. In particular, at equilibrium we only
need to randomize between threshold policies with zero thresholds, so that the
expected sojourn time is equal to that in an n-server common queue system with
the maximum feasible service capacity chosen.
4.5. Comparison of expected sojourn times. In previous subsections, we have
shown that under the payment-at-allocation scheme, a mixed threshold allocation
policy, if allowed to overload servers, can attain the same equilibrium service ca-
pacity as the linear allocation policy while giving a lower (and in fact minimum)
expected sojourn time. However, the implementation of a mixed threshold alloca-
tion policy is complicated and may be costly, especially when the number of servers
is large. In this subsection, we investigate how the ratio of the expected sojourn
time of the two policies changes when the number of servers, n, becomes very large.
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This would provide insight into whether it is worthwhile to implement the mixed
threshold allocation policy when there is a higher implementation cost compared to
the linear allocation policy.
Assume fixed n ≥ 2 and R such that
c(λ/n) <
λR
2
.
Let Wsi and Wsd be the expected sojourn time in equilibrium under the optimal
state-independent allocation and the corresponding replication by the threshold
allocation policy, assuming both allocation yields a unique symmetric equilibrium.
By standard results of an M/M/1 queue, with demand λ/n allocated to each
server, we have
Wsi =
1
µ¯n − λ/n
(2)
By Proposition 3 and standard results of a M/M/n system, we also have
Wsd =
1
µ¯n

 λ
nµ¯n − λ
(
n−1∑
k=0
(k + 1)!
(
n− 1
k
)( µ¯n
λ
)k)−1
+ 1

 . (3)
Combining Equations (2) and (3) we have
Wsd
Wsi
=

a
n
(
n−1∑
k=0
(k + 1)!
(
n− 1
k
)(
1
a
)k)−1
+
n− a
n

 (4)
where a = λ/µ¯n.
We are interested in the limit of the ratio in (4) as n goes to infinity.
Proposition 4. For a given value R such that c(λ/2) < λR/2, if c′(0) = 0, then
lim
n→∞
Wsd
Wsi
= 1.
Otherwise,
lim
n→∞
Wsd
Wsi
≤ 1−
c′(0)
R
(1 − e−R/c
′(0)) < 1.
To understand the implications of the proposition, we first note that the max-
imum feasible service capacity, µ¯, becomes arbitrarily small as n goes to infinity.
Then c′(0) represents the marginal cost of increasing capacity at such a level. From
Proposition 4, we know that if this marginal cost is zero, i.e., if c′(0) = 0, the advan-
tage of using the optimal state-dependent policy over the optimal state-independent
policy vanishes as the number of servers approaches infinity. On the other hand, if
c′(0) > 0, the ratio of the expected sojourn time under the optimal state-dependent
policy to that under the optimal state-independent policy approaches a limit that
is strictly below one when the number of servers approaches infinity.
5. Concluding remarks. In this paper, we have extended the two-server mixed
threshold allocation policy proposed by [1] to the case of n servers. For any state-
independent policy that prohibits server overloading, we have shown that it is
possible to replicate the allocated demand by a mixed threshold policy. We con-
sider two payment schemes: the payment-at-allocation scheme and the payment-
upon-completion scheme. Under the payment-at-allocation scheme, where server-
overloading is possible, we have shown that a mixed threshold allocation policy can
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replicate the allocated demand if we include a single-sourcing strategy in the mixed
policy and allow payment at customer allocation. For the payment-upon-completion
scheme, although we do not know whether the mixed threshold policy can give the
maximum feasible service capacity µ¯, our results do show that the mixed threshold
policy can perform as well as any other state-independent or state-dependent policy
in terms of the induced service capacity. For identical servers, the mixed threshold
policy at the symmetric equilibrium can be composed of only threshold policies with
zero thresholds. As a result, the policy yields the minimal expected sojourn time
with the equilibrium service capacities.
Our results concur with existing two-server results that there are no trade-off
between incentives and efficiency. Whether or not we allow server overloading, we
can find a n-server mixed threshold policy that induces the same service capacity
from the servers as any given state-independent policy. Moreover, in the symmetric
equilibrium, the mixed threshold policy can always give a lower expected sojourn
time.
Our extension of the mixed threshold policy to multiple servers is natural, but
the proof that the n-server mixed threshold policy can replicate any other policy is
significantly more difficult than its two-server counterpart. The technical hurdle lies
in that, in the inductive process of constructing the desire mixed threshold policy,
we need to match the demand of a server while keeping the previously matched ones
the same. This concern was not present in the two-server case and made the proof
much more complicated in both finding the appropriate component pure policies
and in matching the target demand allocation.
Our results have been derived in a framework where servers are identical, i.e. they
have the same cost function c(µ). Nevertheless, the results in Sections 4.1 – 4.2 are
independent of the cost structure of the servers. Therefore, with asymmetric servers,
it is also possible to replicate the demand allocation of any state-independent policy
that prohibits server overloading by an n-server threshold allocation policy. How-
ever, because the Nash equilibrium, when exists, may not be symmetric, it has
yet to be investigated whether a suitable n-server threshold allocation policy per-
forms better than a state-independent policy in terms of achieving a lower expected
sojourn time.
Our results are based on a Markovian queueing system. We believe that a similar
analysis can be carried out in the cases with more general distributions of the
inter-arrival times or service times. However, the actual computation of the n-
server mixed threshold policy may be more complicated due to the difficulty in the
computation of the allocated demand in an n-server threshold system.
In our model, it is assumed that the service capacities chosen by the servers can
be observed by the buyer. However, in reality the buyer has to infer the service
capacities from realized service times. In our study we have not considered how
statistical errors may affect our results. Thus it is an interesting future research
issue.
In Zhang’s work [14], it has been shown that the multiple linear allocation can
achieve the maximum feasible service capacity µ¯ in the Nash equilibrium, under the
payment-at-allocation scheme with server overloading permitted. It then follows
from our results that, if we also allow server overloading and payment at alloca-
tion, there exists an n-server mixed threshold allocation policy that achieves the
maximum feasible service capacity with the minimum feasible expected sojourn
time at equilibrium. However, as mentioned in earlier sections, server overloading
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and payment at allocation cause unnecessary infinite-waiting times at some out-
of-equilibrium plays, and may be undesirable. It still remains to be investigated
whether there exists a state-independent policy without server overloading that
achieves the maximum feasible service capacity under the payment-upon-completion
scheme. Nevertheless, our results still show that the mixed threshold policy can per-
form as well as any other state-independent or state-dependent policy in terms of
the induced service capacities. Thus, if a policy that induces the maximum feasible
service capacity exists, then our results would imply that an optimal mixed thresh-
old allocation policy without server overloading (i.e. λi ≤ µi in all allocation) also
exists.
Our work has proved the existence of an n-server threshold policy that replicates
any given state-independent policy that prohibits server overloading. For any fixed
service capacity and given target demand allocation, it is desirable to find a mixed
policy that not only gives the minimum expected sojourn time, but also randomizes
between minimum number of policies. Finding an efficient way to identify such
a mixed policy may be a direction for future research. Since the n-server mixed
threshold policy involves a set of parameters for each service capacity vectors, an-
other future research issue may be to investigate whether there could be simpler
state-dependent policy with fewer parameters that gives the same incentives and
efficiency.
6. Proof of Lemmas and Propositions.
6.1. Proof of Lemma 4.1.
Proof. For statement (i), When µ1+µ2+ . . .+µk < λ, in any state of the queueing
system, the arrival rate of the queueing system is λ, which is greater than the total
service rate, which is at most µ1 + µ2 + . . . + µk. Considering that a birth-and-
death process with birth rate λ and death rate µ1 + µ2 + . . . + µk is unstable, we
see that the long-run number of customers in the queueing system will be infinite
with probability 1. On the other hand, when the total number of customers in
the system is more than k + m2 + m3 + . . . + mk, Servers 1, 2, . . . , k will always
be in use and so the process of the additional number of customers behaves as
a birth-and-death process with birth rate λ and death rate µ1 + µ2 + . . . + µk.
Therefore, µ1 + µ2 + . . . + µk > λ is sufficient for the system to be stable. When
the system is stable, all customers are served with probability 1. Thus λ =
∑n
i=1 λi.
Statement (ii) is straightforward since, by definition, no customer is allocated to
join the servers i, i+ 1, . . . , n as mi =∞.
For Statement (iii), the fact that
i−1∑
j=1
λj ≤ min

i−1∑
j=1
µj , λ


is straightforward. For the other side, we consider two cases.
Case I: If
∑i−1
j=1 µj > λ, we compare the system with the delay system (subject
to the same inter-arrival times and service times) where the ith, (i + 1)th, . . . , nth
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servers are not used. This is equivalent to the case where mi = ∞. Let Y be the
number of waiting customers in the system. Then we have
lim
k→∞
P (Y ≥ k) = 0
since the system is stable given
∑i−1
j=1 µj > λ.
Now consider the original threshold system with threshold mi. For fixed i, let
Ymi be the total number of customers waiting in the first m2 + m3 + . . . + mi
positions of the queue. Since in this system some customers are allocated to Servers
i, i+ 1, . . . , n while no customer is lost to other servers in the previous system, we
have Ymi ≤ Y for any outcome of the inter-arrival times and service times. Thus
the event Ymi ≥ m2 +m3 + . . .+mi implies Y ≥ m2 +m3 + . . .+mi. This results
in
P (Ymi ≥ m2 +m3 + . . .+mi) ≤ P (Y ≥ m2 +m3 + . . .+mi) .
But then the left-hand-side is nonnegative and the right-hand side approaches zero
as mi → ∞. Clearly the right-hand-side is independent of mi+1, . . . ,mn. For any
 > 0, we have m∗i such that
P (Y ≥ m2 +m3 + . . .+mi) <

λ
for any mi > m
∗
i . Finally by
∑n
j=i λj ≤ λP (Y ≥ m2 +m3 + . . .+mi) we have
i−1∑
j=1
λj = λ−
n∑
j=i
λj > λ− .
Case II: If
∑i−1
j=1 µj ≤ λ, once again, consider Ymi , the number of customers waiting
in first m2 +m3 + . . .+mi positions of the queue under the given threshold policy,
and Y lmi , the number of waiting customers in a loss system that consists of the first
i servers with thresholds m1,m2, . . . ,mi−1 and queue length m2 +m3 + . . . +mi,
with both systems subject to the same inter-arrival times and service times. Then
we have Ymi ≥ Y
l
mi for any outcome of the inter-arrival times and service times.
Thus we have
P (Ymi ≥ m2 +m3 + . . .+mi−1 + 1) ≥ P
(
Y lmi ≥ m2 +m3 + . . .+mi−1 + 1
)
.
Note that the left-hand-side is at most 1, while the right-hand-side is independent
of mi+1, . . . ,mn and converges to 1 as mi →∞ because it approaches the case of a
delay system, which is unstable given
∑i−1
j=1 µj ≤ λ.
Then for any  > 0, we have m∗i such that for any mi > m
∗
i , we have
P (Y lmi ≥ i+m2 + . . .+mi−1) > 1−
∑i−1
j=1 µj
.
Thus we have
i−1∑
j=1
λj ≥
i−1∑
j=1
µjP (Ymi ≥ i+m2+ . . .+mi−1) >
i−1∑
j=1
µj
(
1−
∑i−1
j=1 µj
)
=
i−1∑
j=1
µj−.
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6.2. Proof of Lemma 4.3.
Proof. By statement (iii) of Lemma 4.1, we can find m∗2 such that
n∑
j=2
λj ≤
n∑
j=2
λtj for m2 = m
∗
2.
Assuming that we can find m∗2, . . . ,m
∗
k, k < n such that
n∑
j=l
λj ≤
n∑
j=l
λtj for all l = 2, . . . , k
when m2 = m
∗
2,m3 = m
∗
3, . . . ,mk = m
∗
k. Then again by the statement (iii) of
Lemma 4.1, we can also find m∗k+1 such that
n∑
j=l
λj ≤
n∑
j=l
λtj for all l = 2, . . . , k, k + 1
when m2 = m
∗
2,m3 = m
∗
3, . . . ,mk = m
∗
k,mk+1 = m
∗
k+1. By induction we can find
m∗2, . . . ,m
∗
n such that
n∑
j=l
λj ≤
n∑
j=l
λtj for all l = 2, . . . , n
when m2 = m
∗
2,m3 = m
∗
3, . . . ,mn = m
∗
n.
6.3. Proof of Lemma 4.4.
Proof. Let Q0 be the statement that there exists a mixed threshold policy τm−1
that is λt-dominated and (m− 1)-smaller in the order (1, 2, . . . , n).
Moreover, for q ≥ m−1, let Qq be the statement that, for any l = q, q+1, . . . , n,
there exists a mixed threshold policy τl that is λ
t-dominated and m-smaller in the
order (1, 2, . . . ,m− 2, l,m− 1,m, . . . , l− 1, l+1, . . . , n) with demand allocation λ(l)
such that
λ
(l)
i = λ
t
i for i = m− 1, . . . , q − 1. (5)
Then we see that Qm−1 is true by hypothesis, since the index set of i in (5) is empty
when q = m− 1. We want to show that if Qq is true, then either Q0 is true or Qq+1
is true.
Now suppose Qq is true. If among any of the policies τl we have λ
(l)
l ≤ λ
t
l ,
then it is λt-dominated and (m− 1)-smaller in the order 1, 2, . . . , n and Q0 is true.
Otherwise, we have λ
(l)
l > λ
t
l for all l = q, q + 1, . . . , n. However, as policy τj is
λt-dominated and m-smaller in the order (1, 2, . . . ,m− 2, j,m− 1,m, . . . , j − 1, j+
1, . . . , n), we also have λ
(j)
q ≤ λtq for j = q+1, q+2, . . . , n. This implies that for any
j = q+1, q+2, . . . , n, there exists 0 ≤ αj ≤ 1 such that αjλ
(q)
q +(1−αj)λ
(j)
q = λtq .
Then by mixing policy τ (q) with probability αj and τ
(j) with probability (1− αj),
we have a policy that is λt-dominated and m-smaller in the order (1, 2, . . . ,m −
2, j,m− 1,m, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, n) because
αjλ
(q)
i + (1− αj)λ
(j)
i ≤ λ
t
i for all i = q + 1, . . . , n and i 6= j
and
αjλ
(q)
i + (1− αj)λ
(j)
i = λ
t
i for all i = m− 1,m, . . . , q.
It is also clear that Qq+1 is true.
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Finally, note that if Qn is true, it immediately follows that Q0 is true because
λi = λ
t
i for all i = m− 1, . . . , n− 1
together with
∑n
i=m−1 λi ≤
∑n
i=m−1 λ
t
i, implying λn ≤ λ
t
n. Hence the statement
(Qn or Q0) implies Q0 itself.
If we let P (q) be the statement that Q0 or Qq is true, for q = m − 1,m, . . . , n.
Then the above implies that we have P (m − 1) being true, and that P (q) implies
P (q + 1) for q = m− 1, . . . , n− 1. Inductively we have P (n) is true, which implies
Q0 is true.
6.4. Proof of Lemma 4.5.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume k = 1 (for notational convenience). By
Lemma 4.3, we can find m∗2, . . . ,m
∗
n such that the threshold policy is λ
t-dominated
in the order (1, 2, . . . , n) whenever m2 = m
∗
2,m3 = m
∗
3, . . . ,mn = m
∗
n. However,
the result can be applied to any permutation of the n− 1 servers (except Server k)
by re-labeling. In the following, we demonstrate that we can get a mixed threshold
policy that satisfies condition (1) by randomizing between these threshold policies.
Define i1 = 1 for notational convenience. Let P (m) be the statement that
for any distinct i2, i3, . . . , in ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n}, there exists a mixed threshold pol-
icy τm,i1,i2,...,in−1,in that is λ
t-dominated and m-smaller in the order (i1, i2, . . . , in).
From the above we established P (n).
Now, suppose P (m) is true for some 2 < m ≤ n. Then for any distinct i2, . . . , in ∈
{2, 3, . . . , n}, there exists a mixed threshold policy τm,i1,i2,...,in that is λ
t-dominated
and m-smaller in the order (i1, i2, . . . , in).
Now, for any distinct i2, . . . , in ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n}, there exists threshold policies
τ (l) ≡ τm,i1,i2,...,im−2,il,im−1,...,il−1,il+1,...,in−1 for any l = m− 1,m, . . . , n
that is λt-dominated and m-smaller in the following order
(i1, i2, . . . , im−2, il, im−1, . . . , il−1, il+1, . . . , in).
Then by Lemma 4.4 (with re-labelling), there exists a mixed threshold policy
τm−1,i1,i2,...,in that is λ
t-dominated and (m− 1)-smaller in the order (i1, i2, . . . , in),
i.e. P (m − 1) is true. By induction, we have P (2) is true, i.e., there exists a pol-
icy τ such that λj ≤ λ
t
j for all j = 2, 3, . . . , n − 1. It follows immediately from∑n
i=1 λi =
∑n
i=1 λ
t
i = λ that λ1 ≥ λ
t
1.
6.5. Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. For m = 1, 2, . . . , n, let P (m) be the statement that for any fixed i = m,m+
1, . . . , n, we have a mixed threshold policy τm,i such that

λ
(m,i)
j = λ
t
j j = 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1
λ
(m,i)
i ≥ λ
t
i
λ
(m,i)
j ≤ λ
t
j j = m,m+ 1, . . . , n and j 6= i.
Then from Lemma 4.5 we have P (1) is true. Suppose P (k) is true for some k < n.
Then we have the mixed threshold policies τk,k, τk,k+1, . . . , τk,n such that

λ
(k,i)
j = λ
t
j j = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1
λ
(k,i)
i ≥ λ
t
i
λ
(k,i)
j ≤ λ
t
j j = k, k + 1, . . . , n and j 6= i
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for i = k, k + 1, . . . , n.
Then for i = k + 1, k + 2, . . . , n, there exists a constant 0 ≤ αk,i ≤ 1 such that
αk,iλ
(k,k)
k + (1− αk,i)λ
(k,i)
k = λ
t
k.
Let τk+1,i denote the policy that mixes τk,k and τk,i with probability αk,i and
1− αk,i. Then we also have
λ
(k+1,i)
j =


αk,iλ
(k,k)
j + (1− αk,i)λ
(k,i)
j = λ
t
j
for j = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1, k.
αk,iλ
(k,k)
j + (1− αk,i)λ
(k,i)
j ≤ αk,iλ
t
j + (1 − αk,i)λ
t
j = λ
t
j
for j = k + 1, . . . , n and j 6= i.
Moreover,
λ
(k+1,i)
i = λ−
∑
j 6=i
λ
(k+1,i)
j ≥ λ−
∑
j 6=i
λtj = λ
t
i.
Therefore P (k + 1) is true. By the principle of mathematical induction, we have
P (m) is true for all m = 1, 2, . . . , n. Note that P (n) means that there exists a mixed
threshold policy τn,n such that{
λ
(n,n)
j = λ
t
j j = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1
λ
(n,n)
n ≥ λtn
However, since we have
λ(n,n)n = λ−
∑
j 6=n
λ
(n,n)
j = λ−
∑
j 6=n
λtj = λ
t
n,
the result follows.
6.6. Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. Let λ(1) be the allocated demand vector of a pure threshold policy with
m2 = m3 = . . . = mn = 0 and Server i being the i
th server, i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Note that since µc > λ/n and all servers are used, the system is stable and thus∑n
i=1 λ
(1)
i = λ.
For j = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1, let Tj be the pure threshold policy with m2 = m3 = . . . =
mn = 0 and Server i being the (i+ j)
th server when i+ j ≤ n, and the (i+ j−n)th
server otherwise. Then we have
λ
Tj
i =
{
λ
(1)
i+j i+ j ≤ n
λ
(1)
i+j−n i+ j > n
Let τj be the mixed threshold policy that is comprised T0, T1, . . . , Tn−1, each with
probability 1/n being used. Then we have for any i = 1, 2, . . . , n
λτi =
n−1∑
j=0
λ
Tj
i /n =
1
n
·

n−i∑
j=0
λ
(1)
i+j +
n−1∑
j=n−i+1
λ
(1)
i+j−n

 = 1
n
·

 n∑
j=i
λ
(1)
j +
i−1∑
j=1
λ
(1)
j

 = λ
n
.
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6.7. Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof. First, because all servers have the same service capacity and all thresholds
are zero, the state of the system can be represented by the number of customers
in the system. Moreover, the designation of 1st, 2nd, . . . , nth servers do not affect
the expected number of customers in the system because all servers have the same
service capacities. Let Xc denote the number of customers in the n-server common
queue system with all service capacities being µc. Also, let Xt denote the number
of customers in the system under an n-server threshold allocation policy with all
thresholds being zero. Suppose the system is subject to the same arrivals and service
times, then we have Xc = Xt Taking expectation, we have E[Xc] = E[Xt].
The Little’s Queueing formula states that in a stable system we have L = λW ,
where L is the long-term average number of customers in the system and W is the
long-term average time a customer spends in the system. Since λ is the same for
both systems under consideration, we have the expected sojourn times equal, i.e.
Wc = Wt where Wc and Wt are, respectively, the expected sojourn time in the
n-server common-queue system and under the threshold allocation policy with all
threshold being zeros.
6.8. Proof of Proposition 4.
Proof. Since µ¯n is given by
c(µ¯n) =
λR
n
,
an = λ/µ¯n goes to infinity as n goes to infinity.
To find out the limit, we first note that
lim
n→∞
an
n
= lim
n→∞
λ/n
µ¯n
= lim
n→∞
λ/n
c−1(λR/n)
= lim
x→∞
λ/x
c−1(λR/x)
.
Applying L’Hoˆpital’s rule we get
lim
x→∞
λ/x
c−1(λR/x)
= lim
x→∞
−λ/x2
−λR(c−1)′(λR/x)/x2
= lim
x→∞
1
R(c−1)′(λR/x)
.
Finally note that
1
(c−1)′(λR/n)
= c′(µ¯n)
by the inverse function theorem. Thus
lim
n→∞
an
n
= lim
n→∞
c′(µ¯n)
R
=
c′(0)
R
,
since limn→∞ µ¯n = 0 and c
′(.) is continuous.
Case 1: c′(0) = 0
Then we have
lim
n→∞
an
n
=
c′(0)
R
= 0
n−1∑
k=0
(k + 1)!
(
n− 1
k
)(
1
an
)k
≥
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)(
1
an
)k
= exp
{
ln
(
1 + 1an
)n−1} (6)
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For any real x > 0,
lim
x→∞
ln
(
1 +
1
ax
)x−1
= lim
x→∞
[
(x − 1) ln
(
1 +
1
ax
)]
= lim
x→∞
[
x ln
(
1 +
1
ax
)
− ln
(
1 +
1
ax
)]
= lim
x→∞
ln (1 + 1/ax)
1/x
− 0 = lim
x→∞
ln
(
1 + c−1(λR/x)/λ
)
1/x
= lim
x→∞
(
1 + c−1(λR/x)/λ
)−1
· (1/λ) · (c−1)′(λR/x) · (λR) · (−1/x2)
−1/x2
= lim
x→∞
R(c−1)′(λR/x)
1 + c−1(λR/x)/λ
= lim
x→∞
λR/c′(µ¯x)
λ+ µ¯x
=∞
since c′(0) = 0 and limx→∞ µ¯x = 0.
Consequently we have
lim
n→∞
(
n−1∑
k=0
(k + 1)!
(
n− 1
k
)(
1
an
)k)−1
= 0
which then yields
lim
n→∞
Wsd
Wsi
= lim
n→∞

an
n
(
n−1∑
k=0
(k + 1)!
(
n− 1
k
)(
1
an
)k)−1
+
n− an
n


= 0 · 0 + 1− 0 = 1.
Case 2: c′(0) 6= 0
Then we have
lim
n→∞
an
n
=
c′(0)
R
6= 0
Using similar methods as in Case 1, we obtain
lim
x→∞
ln
(
1 +
1
ax
)x−1
= lim
x→∞
λR/c′(µ¯x)
λ+ µ¯x
=
R
c′(0)
Using again inequality (6), we have
lim
n→∞
(
n−1∑
k=0
(k + 1)!
(
n− 1
k
)(
1
an
)k)−1
≤ e−R/c
′(0).
Finally we have
lim
n→∞
Wsd
Wsi
= lim
n→∞

an
n
(
n−1∑
k=0
(k + 1)!
(
n− 1
k
)(
1
an
)k)−1
+
n− an
n


≤
c′(0)
R
e−R/c
′(0) + 1−
c′(0)
R
= 1−
c′(0)
R
(1− e−R/c
′(0)) < 1.
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